European Journal of Political Research **46**: 417–444, 2007
doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00705.x

Divergence or convergence? From ever-growing to ever-slowing European legislative decision making

THOMAS KÖNIG
University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract. This article examines different views of the European Union (EU) legislative decision-making process through a quantitative analysis of all Commission proposals initiated between 1984 and 1999. Using the positions of Member States, the analysis is innovative in two respects: the identification of the relative importance of institutions and preferences for the process of EU legislative decision making, and the empirical evaluation of the ongoing theoretical controversy between constructivists and spatial analysts about the converging or diverging effect of Member State positions. The findings reveal that the process of EU legislative integration is significantly slowing down, even though Council qualified majority voting facilitates decision making while parliamentary participation modestly increases the duration. Against the constructivist claims of convergence, the results show that the divergence of Member State positions significantly determines the duration of the legislative process, in particular in the key domains of EU integration: the larger the distance between the Member States' positions, the longer the EU decision-making process takes. This suggests that the accession of countries with diverging positions will slow down the EU's legislative process, but institutional reform of the Council's decision-making threshold is a promising solution for coping with this effect.

The process of European Union decision making: Institutions and Member State positions

Legislative research on European Union (EU) decision making has entered the stage of quantitative analysis, which can advance dialogue by evaluating where one competing approach applies, controlling for other approaches (Jupille et al. 2003: 29). After years of single proposition studies,[1] rich and systematic data analyses on the process of EU legislative decision making can help answer the most important questions of EU scholars that are raised in the debate not only between spatial analysts[2] (Moravcsik 1999; Schneider & Aspinwall 2001) and constructivists (Checkel 2001; Risse 2002), but also between cooperative (Felsenthal & Machover 2001; Hosli 1999) and non-cooperative game theorists (Garrett & Tsebelis 1999, 2001; Steunenberg et al. 1999), and among spatial analysts themselves (Crombez 1996, 2000; Moser

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2000; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994, 2002). Briefly summarized, most of these debates centre around the interaction between institutions and Member State positions, in particular whether and in which direction Member State preferences determine the process of EU legislative decision making.

For scholars like Thomas Risse (2000: 1), the controversy between social constructivism and spatial analysis 'has become one of the most significant . . . and crossed disciplinary boundaries between international relations and comparative politics'.[3] Other debates about the effect of Member State positions exist between non-cooperative spatial and cooperative voting power analysts, the latter assuming a uniform distribution of actors' preferences (Widgren 1994; König & Bräuninger 1998; Hosli 1999; Felsenthal & Machover 2001).[4] At the same time, the relative influence of the EP *vis-à-vis* the Council has raised an intense controversy among spatial scholars that is also based on the configuration of Member State positions (Steunenberg 1994, 2000; Tsebelis 1994, 2002; Moser 1996; Crombez 1997; Scully 1997a, 1997b). Some scholars suggest that this configuration varies across policy areas depending on the type of policies and their degree of EU integration (Majone 1996; Nugent 1999; Scharpf 1999). Policy areas such as agricultural and internal market policies are central to EU integration and are resolved largely at the EU level, while other policy areas such as cultural and social affairs are mainly regulated at the domestic level (Westlake 1998; Hix 2005).

The evaluation of these competing claims is a difficult task because various criteria exist for the evaluation of their empirical fit, logical coherence, parsimony or robustness (Jupille et al. 2003: 21). Although these approaches consider actors' preferences and institutions, another difficulty is that spatial analysts are primarily concerned with outcomes, while constructivists focus on the process of decision making (Katzenstein 1996). To apply the conventional spatial model to the analysis of the decision-making process, this study uses the time between Commission initiative and Council adoption, and argues that the time spent scrutinizing, monitoring and amending legislative proposals is an indicator of the level of conflict between the actors involved. Although previous duration studies have made this argument, none has yet included Member State positions as a measure of conflict that can vary over policy areas and time (König & Schulz 1997; Golub 1999; Schulz & König 2000; Martin & Vanberg 2004). The following study analyzes process as the common domain of application that will allow the evaluation of the sometimes rival views' explanatory power of the effect of Member State positions and institutions.

To estimate not only the nature of the outcome and the effect of positions on it, but also the time spent for consulting, scrutinizing, deliberating, bargaining a proposal and/or persuading, learning from or socializing other actors, the duration of the legislative process is examined by event history analysis. Using

the duration between Commission initiative and Council decision for almost 9,500 legislative proposals from 1984 to 1999 (before the Amsterdam Treaty came into force), the analysis specifies econometrically the factors influencing the outcome and process of EU legislative decision making. Compared to my previous work with Schulz (König & Schulz 1997; Schulz & König 2000) on the duration of Commission proposals, this study expands the period under study and presents a new method for using the positions of all EU Member States in multiple policy areas over time.[5] Even though the analysis only considers Member State positions and fails to account for the distances to the Commission and the EP, this is the first quantitative study of the EU legislative process that allows for an assessment of whether and how the conflict between Member States matters for the duration of Commission proposals, whether their positions converge or diverge over time and policy areas, and which factors are crucial to understanding the EU legislative process.

The findings reveal that the process of EU legislative integration is significantly slowing down, although the EU is reducing the volume of its legislative activities. The statistical results lend credence to the predictions of spatial scholars showing that the conflict among Member States influences the duration in the expected direction: the larger the distance between the Member States' positions, the longer the EU decision-making process takes. Against the constructivist claims, neither the explorative nor the statistical analysis detects convergent effects of Member State positions. The variation in Member State positions over policy areas and time also supports the criticism of spatial scholars about assuming a uniform distribution of positions, which is done by voting power analysts. Finally, the analysis confirms previous findings on the specific effects of institutions for the legislative process: Council qualified majority voting facilitates, while the participation of the EP slows down EU legislative decision making.

Hypotheses on the duration of EU legislative decision making

EU legislation involves three sets of actors: the EP acting jointly with the Council; the Council acting alone; and the Commission. Several different decision-making procedures specify the circumstances under which they exert different powers.[6] Under all procedures, the Commission has the sole right to propose legislation.[7] Depending on the procedure and the legal treaty reference, the Council can adopt the Commission's proposal under qualified majority or unanimity. Under all procedures, Council amendments require unanimity. In a few, but increasing, number of policy areas, the Council shares legislative power with the EP under the cooperation and co-decision

procedures. None of the legislative procedures imposes strict limits on the duration of the decision-making process, and, unlike other legislatures, a proposal can stay alive notwithstanding a new EP election or treaty reform.[8]

With regard to legislative outcomes, a common idea of spatial analysis is that the size of the win set determines the potential for policy change (i.e., whether the sufficient number of veto players agrees on changing the status quo or not) (Romer & Rosenthal 1979; Rosenthal 1990). This probability for policy change is a function of the distances between the actors' positions and the decision-making provisions (Tsebelis 2002). Applied to the EU, recent empirical spatial studies found that the Commission and/or the EP have rather extreme 'supranational' positions that are located outside the win set of the Member States (König & Pöter 2001; Selck 2004; Thomson et al. 2006). They will initiate proposals and/or propose amendments that find sufficient Member State support, but are located closest to their own supranational positions. Under these conditions, spatial studies predict that the power of the Commission and/or the EP increases with the level of conflict between the Member States (Tsebelis 1994, 2002; Steunenberg 1994; Crombez 1996, 1997; König & Bräuninger 2004).

Applying spatial analysis to the process of EU decision making is difficult because most studies assume common knowledge about the rules and the positions of the actors involved. Under these conditions, the agenda setter would immediately foresee possible constraints and consider them when making a proposal. However, a slightly different perspective suggests that Member States share a common interest in EU legislation and know about the extreme location of the Commission and/or EP; they know the risk of a supranational bias and develop institutional strategies in response to this threat (König 2005). For example, Member States have established committees that scrutinize each draft without limiting the time of this process. In order to avoid a bias against their interests, the working groups, the COREPER and ministers interact in this committee system – they scrutinize Commission proposals and they can credibly threaten to postpone an outcome when referencing their 'vital interest' or calling for the application of the subsidiarity principle (Westlake 1995; Hix 2005; König & Proksch forthcoming). During this stage, Member States supportive of a Commission proposal have an incentive to make offers to other Member States to encourage their vote for a proposal. These reactions and counter-reactions raise time-consuming transaction costs and should be related directly to the size of Member State conflict since the likelihood of effective blockages in the decision-making process forces actors to take time to resolve differences over policy and construct mutually acceptable packages.[9] According to this perspective, we can expect that the *duration increases with the number of veto players and the distance*

between the positions of the Member States. By contrast, if there is broad agreement among Member States on how to change policy, there is no need for time-consuming negotiations over side-payments and package deals.

This prediction is based on the assumption that the positions of Member States are exogenous and stable – a concept that is disputed by constructivists in particular (Checkel 2001; Risse 2002). Admittedly, even though it is hard to identify constructivist hypotheses on the process of legislative decision making, and Moravcsik (1999) even doubts that it is possible to find testable constructivist hypotheses and variables that help to operationalize their claims, a constitutive element of constructivism seems to be a process-oriented view on the construction of social norms with common reference and identity (Katzenstein 1996: Chapter 2; Zetterholm 1994: 4). Jupille et al. (2003: 14) describe constructivism as an approach to social inquiry that is based on two assumptions: the environment in which agents take action is social as well as material; and this setting can provide agents with understanding of their interests (see also Risse 2002: 599). Constructivists propose that persuasion and deliberation constitute a distinct mode to be differentiated from strategic bargaining and rule-guided behaviour. The basic idea is that context and social interaction are assumed to shape the views of the actors (Risse 2000: 8). Norms should provide the actors with a 'new understanding of interests regarding a particular policy issue' (Checkel 2001: 31). The more the norms are contested, the less the logic of the situation can apply.

In addition to this more general statement about constructivism, a number of case studies of these authors may provide more precise insights into expectations that can be derived from this approach. Checkel (2003) studies social interaction and preference change over a seven-year period, in which he finds that the preferences or even identities of the Member State representatives converge over time. Lewis (2003: 106) states that constructivism considers possible 'other-regarding' perspectives on EU decision making due to which Member State representatives might even work to convince their home capitals to offer more concessions. These delegates are still assumed to be egoistic, but also self-restrained in the sense that they develop process interests. From this literature, we can expect that constructivists *predict convergence of positions*: 'where argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or satisfy their given interests and preferences' (Risse 2000: 7). Checkel (2003) adds that frequent interaction can lead to new attitudes with group-shaping understandings. Such effects are particularly likely in those policy areas of the EU in which Member States have a common goal and interact intensively, such as in the core domains of agricultural, trade, common rules and internal market policies. This suggests that – in the core areas of European integration where common norms exist – the distance between

Member State positions will *either not significantly determine or even positively affect the legislative process*.

While these controversies centre on the interaction between Member State positions and institutions, another scholarly debate concerns the nature of EU institutions. The Council is the central legislator in EU legislative decision making because Member States not only adopt all legislation, but can also substantively modify Commission proposals. Under the unanimity rule, all Member States are decisive actors and must prefer a change of the status quo. Mitigating extreme preferences, qualified majority voting may increase the capacity to act. For this reason, institutionalists expect that *qualified majority voting should decrease the duration of Commission proposals*, while other scholars exclude redistributive effects due to the regulatory nature of EU legislative politics (Majone 1994, 1996).

Another question on the nature of EU institutions concerns the role of the EP, which is often related to the democratic deficit (Tsebelis 1997; Crombez 2003). This deficit refers to the partial integration of the EP in legislative decision making. It is partial because the EU uses a number of procedures, and the EP only participates in a few of them. Yet it is also partial because the EP is not the decisive legislator in the procedures in which it does participate. The Single European Act (1987) offered the EP legislative participation for the first time under the cooperation procedure (Garrett 1992). Under certain conditions, this procedure allows the EP conditional agenda setting (Tsebelis 1994).[10] The Maastricht Treaty (1993) provided the EP with a conditional veto right under the co-decision procedure (Schneider 1995; Crombez 1996, 2000). Most empirical studies suggest that the EP has a supranational preference, raising the expectation that Member States will pay additional attention to a Commission proposal that can be amended by the EP. In this case, we expect that the *participation of the EP increases the duration of the EU decision-making process*.

These expectations can be derived by spatial theory and most of them are in opposition to the constructivist conception that actors have goodwill and 'abstain from voting no or vetoing under unanimity' (Lewis 2003: 108). Constructivists widely argue that socialization is a thick process variable meaning that actors in everyday EU decision making form new role conceptions according to which consensus-seeking can become a reflexive habit (Egebert 2000), while the rationalist image predicts that formal requirements of consensus are a hindrance (Lewis 2003: 109). In the constructivist view, veto rights do not significantly matter in the process of legislative decision making. In contrast to spatial analysis, this approach suggests that the *introduction of qualified majority rule and the participation of the EP should not affect significantly the duration of Commission proposals*.

As evidence for the different claims, these approaches have produced a number of case studies on determinants of the EU legislative decision-making process, with mixed results (for an overview, see *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1999; *European Union Politics* 2000) – particularly on the impact of qualified majority voting and parliamentary participation. However, Green and Shapiro (1994) more generally point out that a major weakness of the spatial school is the lack of empiricism. In the case of EU research, very few studies have systematically gathered data that allow for statistical testing of the sometimes competing claims. Only the forthcoming DEU study provides a kind of quantitative case study design on EU legislative decision making using estimates on Member State positions on about 70 Commission proposals in the period from 1999 to 2001 (Thomson et al. 2006). However, there is no database that avoids selection bias over time and sectors. Such selection bias is a particular risk for constructivist research, which tends to be empirical and case-study-oriented, 'engaged in analytical induction and historically grounded comparisons' (Evans et al. 1985: 348). This has led to rich descriptions of rather unique events that suffer from extracting the main causal variables of EU decision making (Schneider & Aspinwall 2001: 15). Moreover, the extracted cases of 'events and phenomena, which cannot be explained by rational theory' suggest a strong selection bias towards confirming this approach.

This study attempts to evaluate the competing views with a quantitative analysis of the EU decision-making process. Although the data cover a lengthy period of EU legislative activities, one may argue that these data can hardly operationalize some longitudinal claims of constructivist research. A similar criticism might come from the interpretation of time as an indicator for a strategic perspective of the spatial model. The central questions are whether and how the positions of the Member States impact the legislative process, and whether and how institutional arrangements, such as qualified majority voting and parliamentary participation, matter for this process. For this purpose, this study presents a method to extract sector-specific Member State positions from domestic party manifestos using the (weighted) distance between the most extreme governmental positions of the Member States. This variable is matched with procedural characteristics of the more than 9,500 Commission proposals initiated and adopted in the Council between 1984 and 1999.

Data on Member State positions and legislative characteristics

Evaluating theoretical accounts of the EU decision-making process is complicated by data and methodological problems. Compared to other legislatures, few systematic data sources are available. Only a few pioneering studies have

systematically gathered data on actors' positions in EU legislative decision making. Mattila and Lane (2001), for example, work with Council voting records to predict coalitional patterns in the period from 1995 to 1998, Tsebelis et al. (2001) use about 5,000 parliamentary amendments for their study of EP influence, König and Pöter (2001) analyze four Commission proposals, and Thomson et al. (2006) gathered actors' position on about 70 Commission proposals that were adopted in the period 1999–2001. These valuable contributions can cover neither the period of this study nor the entire set of EU legislation. For this reason, this study proposes using domestic party manifesto data as proxies for the positions of Member State governments with respect to the thematic areas of European politics.

Using domestic party manifesto data as proxies for the positions of Member State governments corresponds to an intergovernmentalist view, according to which domestic interests determine legislative decision making at the EU level, and these interests are represented and decided by governmental actors (Moravcsik 1998). These positions of Member State governments will be linked to data on EU legislative decision making. By processing information extracted from the EU full-text CELEX database, a dataset of all Commission proposals for binding EU legislation has been constructed.[11] For the purpose of analysis, the full-text information has been downloaded for all proposals initiated between 1965 and May 1999 (the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty). These data contain information on the procedural characteristics of each proposal (date of initiative or adoption, procedure being applied, instrument used, etc.). Since CELEX is complete only from 1984, the analysis is limited to proposals made in 1984 and thereafter (see http://europa.eu.int/celex/htm/doc/en/chapter1_en.htm). Due to the considerable delay of updating Council adoptions, proposals made after November 1998 are excluded.

Procedural characteristics

Methodologically, analyses of EU decision-making duration include a large number of right censored observations: proposals made by the Commission that are pending decision in the Council.[12] Standard regression models are inappropriate for this analysis, as are logit and probit models, because they do not allow for censored observations in estimating parameters, thus introducing a bias resulting from deleting such observations. In regression models, the residuals are assumed to be distributed normally, while event history analysis provides an alternative for the normality assumption because it is unreasonable to assume normality of time to the adoption of legislative proposals. Event history analysis is specifically designed for the analysis of duration data



Figure 1. Number of proposals and decisions per year.



Figure 2. Median proposal-decision time lag by year.

and allows censored observations to be used in estimating parameters. All that is known about a censored observation is that a failure event occurs after time.

Figure 1 illustrates the Commission's and Council's activities in this period. From the beginning of the 1980s until middle of the 1990s, the number of Commission initiatives and of adoptions by the Council continuously increased. Except for the time around the Maastricht Treaty (1993), these activities follow a decreasing trend. In the mid-1990s, the number of initiatives and adoptions was lower than at the beginning of the 1980s, before the EU's internal market programme started. This trend should be more significant because an increasing number of Commission proposals only modify existing EU legislation. This means that EU legislative integration has considerably slowed down since the beginning of the 1990s. Figure 2 illustrates how the

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Value	Frequency	Percentage
Adopted	0 (= no)	2,165	23.7
	1 (= yes)	6,966	76.3
Rule	0 (= unanimity)	3,142	34.4
	1 (= qualified majority)	5,989	65.6
Parliament	0 (= participates)	1,677	18.4
	1 (= no)	7,454	81.6
Agricultural sector	0 (= no)	6,141	67.3
	1 (= yes)	2,990	32.7
Trade sector	0 (= no)	6,928	75.9
	1 (= yes)	2,203	24.1
Internal market	0 (= no)	8,609	94.3
	1 (= yes)	522	5.7
Common rules	0 (= no)	8,455	92.6
	1 (= yes)	676	7.4
1 January 1984–31 December 1985	1 (= yes)	1,221	13.4
	0 (= later)	7,910	86.6
1 January 1986–30 June 1987	1 (= yes)	888	9.7
	0 (= before or later)	8,243	90.3
1 July 1987–31 October 1993	1 (= yes)	4,224	46.3
	0 (= before or later)	4,907	53.7
1 November 1993–31 December 1995	1 (= yes)	685	7.5
	0 (= before or later)	8,446	92.5
1 January 1995–31 December 1998	1 (= yes)	1,703	18.7
	0 (= before or later)	7,428	81.3

decision-making process has slowed down on average in recent years. While the median proposal-adoption time lag was about 100 days until the end of the 1980s, it markedly increased in the early 1990s to around 140 days. Table 1 provides some other descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables of the EU decision-making process.

The adoption rate of about 76 per cent is unusually high for legislative politics. There are two reasons that are of importance for this EU-specific effect. First, Commission proposals are rarely rejected and are pending over a long period of time. About 15 per cent of all proposals decided upon had a time lag of more than one year. Second, compared to other legislatures, the EU has no competitive initiators. The Commission formally initiates all legislation, whereas opposition (minority) proposals cause lower adoption rates in other legislatures. Another characteristic concerns the high share of proposals allowing for Council qualified majority voting (about 66 per cent) and a small but increasing share of EP participation (about 18 per cent). Although the co-decision procedure is becoming more important, this small share does not allow for distinguishing the impact of the specific procedural arrangement of parliamentary participation. Most activities are found in the agricultural (about 33 per cent) and trade (about 24 per cent) sectors. In sum, EU legislation is characterized by a high adoption rate in the agricultural and trade sectors, which allow for Council qualified majority voting without EP participation.

Member State positions

For the study of EU legislative decision making, a major challenge is the inclusion of estimators for Member State positions in multiple policy areas over time. This study uses party manifestos for all political parties in the Member States, as has been done in analyses of domestic politics in the past (Laver & Budge 1992; Klingemann et al. 1994). Applying these data to the study of the EU legislative decision-making process requires several steps. First, national party manifestos are merged with data on the party composition of the corresponding governments, including the date of their inauguration and dismissal. To relate these data to policy areas, their positions are computed for specific EU policy sectors like agricultural, trade and internal market politics (see Appendix).[13] The resulting set of cases was completed with a European integration dimension that refers to the pro- and anti-European attitude of political parties (Hix 1999; Gabel & Hix 2002; Hooghe et al. 2002; Pennings 2002). This dimension is used to code all proposals that do not belong to the central EU areas of agricultural, common rules, trade and internal market politics.

To estimate the positions of the Member States, the positions of the governmental parties are averaged, and a weighted and a non-weighted version are distinguished with the former considering the size of the coalition partners in terms of their seats in parliament. The weighted version attempts to reflect the different size of the coalition partners, while the non-weighted version assumes symmetric power distribution within the coalition. Finally, to calculate the conflict among Member States, the most extreme positions of the area-specific set of Member States are used. Empirically, these distances change greatly over time and between the sectors. According to Figure 3, Member States' conflict on common rules continuously increased from the beginning to the end of the 1980s. After a convergence in the beginning of the 1990s, the dissent among Member States about common rules again ascended. Disagreement in the two dominant policy sectors, trade and agricultural policy, is lower. Although the smaller distance between the Member States is presumably induced by the manifesto counting procedure using a standardized scheme with different numbers of coding items, their development differs from the other slopes. In both domains, the distances notably changed after the 1990s. The internal market conflict steadily changed over time, but the views on



Figure 3. Distances between Member States in multiple policy domains, 1984–1999 (unweighted version).

European integration mostly differed in the beginning of the 1990s. Weighting the impact of the governmental coalitions modestly changes the slope of the differences.

Ideally, the quantitative study of the legislative process could further benefit from having estimators for the positions of the Commission and the EP. However, as far as I am aware, a comparable party manifesto database is not available that would provide the positions of the Commission and the parliamentary groups of the EP across time and policy areas. The sector-specific estimators of the Member States are matched with the data on procedural characteristics at the proposal level. This matching procedure refers to the time of initiative and the indication of the policy domain according to the article provided as the legal basis for Commission initiatives. Of course, one might suggest using the time of adoption as the source of information, but then questions remain on how to handle pending proposals. Another coding problem concerns multiple legal indications. These cases are scored in the reference category that is linked to the European integration dimension. According to this matching procedure, proposals are related to actors' sector-specific distances, which vary across area and over time at the proposal level. Whether and how these domain-specific distances matter for the EU legislative decision-making process is derived in the following event history analysis.

Analyzing the process: Institutions, preferences and their effect on duration

Event history analysis refers to the analysis of data on the number, timing and sequence of 'events' for some sample within a given continuous time period of observation. An event is a change in the value of some discrete random variable, $Y(t)$, that is defined over some time interval and that has a countable number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive values. In this case, $Y(t)$ denotes the status of a Commission proposal at time t and can have one of two values, 'pending decision' (the origin state) or 'decided' (the destination state); an event occurs when a Commission proposal moves from its origin state to the destination state – that is, when the Council decides on the proposal. Otherwise, the proposal remains pending.

To examine competing claims for the EU decision-making process this study uses the time lag between a Commission proposal and a Council decision as the central indicator of the duration of the EU decision-making process. This means that the analysis concentrates on the quantity of legislative output and, more importantly, on the duration T of the decision-making process for this output. Although the substantive output of EU legislation can hardly be

measured without an inherently subjective evaluation, a necessary condition is still to produce legislation in a timely fashion. For this reason, studies on the EU legislative process pointed to the slowing down of decision-making speed (Krislov et al. 1986; Sloot & Verschuren 1990; König & Schulz 1997; Schulz & König 2000). Figure 4 shows the distribution of the duration *T* of Commission proposals. Most proposals are decided within the first 150 days, but many proposals are first adopted after two or three years.

To analyze how the duration in a specific state is influenced by certain covariates, event history analysis offers parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric modeling. When no covariates exist, or when the covariates are qualitative in nature, one can use nonparametric modeling. However, because the non-parametric analysis does not control for possibly confounding variables, the results may be entirely due to omitted variables. A popular alternative is to estimate a so-called 'semi-parametric' or Cox model that assumes that the hazard rates for different values of covariates are proportional. A hazard rate gives the instantaneous rate of an event occurring at time *t*. A necessary condition for the proportional hazard assumption to be met is that the hazard functions for two categories of a covariate do not cross. A quick



Figure 4. Distribution of the duration in days.

inspection of the data shows that, the proportional hazard assumption is violated for EU decision making between 1984 and 1999. Hence, it is not appropriate to estimate a semi-parametric model.[14]

The parametric approach assumes some specific distribution of duration time and then makes this distribution dependent on the covariates by linking them to the parameters of the distribution. Hence, the first step is to specify the time dependence of the hazard rate. A large number of different parameterizations have been proposed in the literature, and the general rule is to choose a functional form that approximates the hypothesized shape of the hazard function. Figure 4 suggests that it is appropriate to estimate a model in which rates change non-monotonically. The log-logistic model is often proposed when the hazard rate has a non-monotonic pattern. This model assumes that the duration variable T follows a log-logistic distribution with a mean $-\log(a)$ and a variance $\pi^2/(3b^2)$. The survivor and hazard rate function for this distribution are

$$S(t) = \frac{1}{1+(at)^b} \tag{1}$$

and

$$h(t) = \frac{ba^b t^{b-1}}{1+(at)^b} \tag{2}$$

(1) implies

$$Q(S(t)) \equiv \log\left(S(t)^{-1} - 1\right) = b\log a + b\log t \tag{3}$$

Hence, if a plot of $Q(S(t))$ versus $\log t$ is roughly linear, a log-logistic model should fit the data reasonably well.[15] Assuming that covariates affect only the -term of the model and that

$$a = \exp\{\mathrm{x}'\beta\} \tag{4}$$

where x is the vector of covariates and β the associated vector of coefficients to be estimated.[16] The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The log-likelihood function is

$$\mathrm{I} = \sum_{i\in N} \log\left\{\frac{ba^b t_i^{b-1}}{1+(at_i)^b}\right\} + \sum_{i\in M} \log\left\{\frac{1}{1+(at_i)^b}\right\} \tag{5}$$

Table 2 summarizes the findings in terms of the effect of a variable on the hazard rate. For each model, the coefficient of a variable indicates the direction of the effect on the hazard rate. Model A includes the main procedural variables of institutional reform, qualified majority decision making (RULE) and parliamentary participation (PARLIAMENT). The coefficients of RULE and PARLIAMENT confirm most of the claims of the spatial analysts and institutionalists because they have the expected sign and are highly significant, also indicating that the results of the non-parametric analysis are not due to collinearity among those variables. The application of Council qualified majority voting and the exclusion of the EP significantly increase the duration.

Models B1 and B2 list the effects of Member State preference distances or conflict for the unweighted and weighted versions. The sectoral values of the distances among Member States are interaction effects combining the sectoral affiliation of a Commission proposal with the respective preference configuration. Except insignificance of common rules (D_Comrul), the sectoral values have the expected negative coefficient. In the agricultural, trade and internal market sectors, the distances between Member State positions confirm the prediction of spatial scholars: the larger the distance between the Member State positions, the longer the duration of the EU legislative decision-making process. We find the highest values in trade and internal market policy, followed by agricultural policy. These results differ marginally in the weighted version of Model B2.

Models C1 and C2 consider all variables and confirm the predictions of spatial analysts for the institutional and positional variables. Qualified majority voting greatly facilitates decision making, while parliamentary participation remains a retarding variable. In both versions of the full model, the sectoral variables for agricultural, trade and internal market policies have the expected sign and confirm the predictions of spatial scholars. Only in the weighted version do the values of common rules become significant and have a moderate positive sign. Figures 5 to 9 illustrate the hazard rates of the significant variables. Note that the weighted version produces very similar figures.

In Figures 5 to 7, we find that the probability of being pending significantly increases with the distance between the actors' positions: the more intense the conflict, the less likely the proposal is adopted in a timely fashion. This effect is more pronounced for trade policy than for internal market policy, but the effect of actors' distances only slows down after about 2,000 days. Figures 8 and 9 show the effect of the institutional provisions for the hazard rate of Commission proposals. Compared to parliamentary participation in the cooperation or co-decision procedure, qualified majority voting enormously decreases the pending probability, while the institutional effect also slows down at around 2,000 days.

Table 2. Findings

	Model A	Model B1 (unweighted)	Model B2 (weighted)	Model C1 (unweighted)	Model C2 (weighted)
Rule	0.7766216***			0.7531765***	0.7553044***
Parliament	–0.187761***			–0.1462227***	–0.144751***
Distance		0.0365206***	0.038982***	0.0114463***	0.009475**
D_Agriculture		–0.077109***	–0.069881***	–0.0716944***	–0.068973***
D_Trade		–0.17978***	–0.183218***	–0.1254661***	–0.127437***
D_Comrule		0.0232716	0.0280485	0.0228002	0.0280622**
D_Intern. Market		–0.112539***	–0.163055***	–0.1134133***	–0.162678***
Constant	7.406682***	7.322295***	0.0521469***	7.251471***	7.260737***
N	9,131	9,131	9,131	9,131	9,131
Log-likelihood	–2814.8679	–2912.0861	–2906.4796	–2702.8978	–2698.5737
LR-Chi^2	501.44	307.00	318.21	725.38	734.03
Pro > Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000



Figure 5. Hazard rates by distance between actors (agriculture: unweighted preferences).



Figure 6. Hazard rates by distance between actors (trade: unweighted preferences).

Conclusion: From ever-growing towards an ever slower EU?

This study examined the impact of institutional provisions and Member State positions on the EU decision-making process from a quantitative perspective. In order to evaluate competing approaches, suggestions have been made on the operationalization of competing scholarly debates, in particular on constructivist and spatial scholars' claims, as well as on a common domain of application: the process of EU legislative decision making. To account for the interaction between the Commission, the Member States and the EP, the time lag between a Commission proposal and a Council decision has been calculated as the central indicator of this process. With reference to the literature,



Figure 7. Hazard rates by distance between actors (internal market: unweighted preferences).



Figure 8. Hazard rates by decision rule.

hypotheses on Member State positions and institutions were derived and evaluated against another.

Studying the different claims for the EU decision-making process, two datasets were constructed that contain systematic information on the characteristics of Commission proposals and configurations of Member State positions. These data cover all Commission proposals and Council adoptions between 1984 and 1999. They also list the crucial characteristics for EU legislative decision making – namely the participation of the EP and the use of qualified majority voting in the Council. These data were related to the



Figure 9. Hazard rates by involvement of the parliament.

sector-specific positions of the Member States derived from domestic party manifestos. The findings show that institutional provisions have significant effects on the decision-making process. Differences in the Member State positions are visible at the sectoral level. In the three core policy areas that cover more than two-thirds of EU legislation (i.e., agricultural, trade and internal market policy), the distances between Member State positions vary and do not converge over time.

The statistical results for the EU decision-making process provide strong support for the spatial school of thought: the use of qualified majority rule decreases the proposal-decision time lag; participation of the EP increases the duration of the decision-making process; and the distances between the positions of Member States significantly influence the duration in the expected direction. These effects especially matter for the core policy domains of the EU, where common norms and regular interaction are expected to exist: The larger the distances between the Member State positions, the longer the duration of Commission proposals. The results also show that the process of EU legislative integration is slowing down in general. Compared to the first two periods, this effect enormously increased in the 1990s and reveals that the ever-growing EU is moving towards an ever-slower EU.

Applying these results to the most recent events – the coming into force of the Nice Treaty (2003), the accession of ten countries (2004), the delay of the constitution (2005) and the upcoming accession of further countries – the analysis clearly demonstrates that Member State positions do not converge over time, and distances in their positions significantly determine the duration of Commission proposals. If the accession of countries expands the core of the Member States, and if the EU is unable to reform the institutional framework,

the EU's legislative activities will be delayed. However, the results also indicate that institutional reform – in particular the lowering of the Council decision-making threshold – can facilitate EU legislative decision making. Compared to facilitating Council decision making, participation of the EP has a more moderate impact on decision-making speed. Thus, the expansion of the co-decision procedure with reducing the Council voting threshold seems to be an efficient solution for an enlarging EU.

Appendix

Dimensions		Items
European integration	Positive	*European Community*: Favourable mentions of European Community in general; desirability of expanding the European Community and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member).
	Negative	*European Community*: Hostile mentions of the European Community; opposition to specific European policies that are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as European integration, but negative.
Internal market	Positive	*Freedom and Human Rights*: Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries. *Decentralisation*: Support for federalism or devolution; more regional autonomy for policy or economy; support for keeping up local and regional customs and symbols; favourable mentions of special consideration for local areas; deference to local expertise. *Free Enterprise*: Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private property rights, personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises.

Appendix Continued.

Dimensions		Items
		Incentives: Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start enterprises; need for financial and other incentives such as subsidies.
		Market Regulation: Need for regulations designed to make private enterprises work better; actions against monopolies and trusts, and in defence of consumer and small business; encouraging economic competition; social market economy.
		Economic Planning: Favourable mentions of longstanding economic planning of a consultative or indicative nature, need for government to create such a plan.
		Technology and Infrastructure: Importance of modernisation of industry and methods of transport and communication; importance of science and technological developments in industry; need for training and research. This does not imply education in general
	Negative	*Nationalisation*: Favourable mentions of government ownership, partial or complete, including government ownership of land.
Trade politics	Positive	*Protectionism: Negative*: Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as *Protectionism: Positive* but negative.
		Productivity: Need to encourage or facilitate greater production; need to take measures to aid this; appeal for greater production and importance of productivity to the economy; increasing foreign trade; the paradigm of growth.
	Negative	*Protectionism: Positive*: Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions.
		Anti-Growth Economy: Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics and steady state economy; ecologism; 'Green politics'; sustainable development.

Appendix Continued.

Dimensions		Items
Common rules	Positive	*Centralisation*: Opposition to political decision making at lower political levels; support for more centralisation in political and administrative procedures; otherwise as Decentralisation, but negative.
		Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more effective.
		Political Accountability: Favourable mentions to strong governments, including government stability.
	Negative	*Decentralisation*: Support for federalism or devolution; more regional autonomy for policy or economy; support for keeping up local and regional customs and symbols; favourable mentions of special consideration for local areas; deference to local expertise.
		Political Corruption: Need to eliminate corruption and associated abuse in political and public life.
Agricultural politics	Positive	*Controlled Economy*: General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, wages, rents, etc.; state intervention in the economic system.
		Agriculture and Farmers: Support for agriculture and farmers; any policy aimed specifically at benefiting these.
	Negative	

Note: Percentages out of 56 categories grouped into seven major policy areas. Because of the different length of documents, the number of (quasi-)sentences in each category is standardised taking the total number of (quasi-)sentences in the respective documents as a base. In the dataset, each of these categories is a variable that represents the percentage.

Notes

1. According to Jupille et al. (2003: 25), most existing EU research only tests single propositions in an uncontrolled way against a null model of no effect. Except for claiming that one theory works, this design cannot advance competitive dialogue.

2. In the following, I use the term 'spatial analysis' in accordance with Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) as well as Hinich and Munger (1997).
3. While other scholars have used the terms 'rational choice' (Risse 2000; Checkel 2001) or 'rational choice institutionalism' (Schneider & Aspinwall 2001), there is also much debate on the relevance of preferences between cooperative voting power and non-cooperative spatial analysts in the EU literature, both using the rational choice framework. The assumption of a uniform distribution of Member State preferences by cooperative studies has been widely criticized by spatial analysts (Tsebelis 2002).
4. This approach, which assumes simple games with dichotomous preferences that are uniformly distributed among the actors, has been criticized by spatial analysts who point to the over-emphasis of actors with extreme policy positions in voting power studies (Garrett & Tsebelis 1999, 2001; Steunenberg et al. 1999).
5. A previous quantitative study by Golub (1999) analyzes the duration only of Commission Directives and finds that the use of qualified majority has decreased the length of this process. However, Directives are a rather specific instrument that only accounts for a fifth of EU legislation. Schulz and König (2000) studied the duration of about 5,400 Commission proposals in the period from 1984–1995. They theorize about the impact of the spatial model of legislative choice and show that the duration of EU legislation is speeding up in the core policy domains, while this study will control for the distances between the actors' policy positions. Using estimators for the preferences of the Member States and providing evidence for additional characteristics such as the location of the status quo and the behaviour of the Commission, the following analysis goes far beyond these analyses.
6. The most important legislative procedures are the *standard* procedure (the basic legislative procedure introduced by the Treaties of Rome), the *cooperation* procedure (introduced by the Single European Act of 1987) and the *co-decision* procedure (introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1993). For a description of the major legislative procedures, see Hartley (1994: 38–56); for a description of their field of application, see König (1996: 553–559).
7. While the Commission has the formal authority to propose legislation, the Council or the EP may request the Commission to submit a proposal (Article 152 EC and Article 138b EC). In other words, the Commission has proposal power, but no gate keeping power.
8. Article 189b (c) implies that under the co-decision (cooperation) procedure a maximum of 14 (9) months may elapse from the beginning of the second reading for a proposal to be adopted; however, neither article imposes limits on the duration of the first reading. In general, proposals can be decided after years of deliberation, including a change in membership size by accession and a revision of the treaties, even if the original proposal will then be decided under a different procedure.
9. The argument corresponds to the transaction cost argument in committee systems, originally made by Buchanan and Tullock (1965) and Sartori (1962). In addition to external costs, they consider the decision-making costs, which increase with the number of actors and the level of the voting threshold. Using their approach, it can be easily demonstrated that these costs increase with the distances between actors' policy positions.
10. Steunenberg (1994), Moser (1996) as well as Scully (1997a, 1997b) disagree with Tsebelis (1994) and Tsebelis and Garrett (1997) on the importance of the EP and the Commission under the cooperation procedure (for a comparison of the explanatory power of the competing views, see König & Pöter 2001).

11. The data analyzed here are available online at: http://dosei.dhv-speyer.de/Koenig_downloads/.
12. 'Censoring' is defined as when the failure event occurs and the subject is not under observation. 'Left censoring' means the failure event occurs prior to the subject under observation, while 'right censoring' concerns when the failure event has not yet occurred. To cope with the problem of 'right censoring' in this study, I considered the median duration of 152 days between Commission initiative and Council adoption. Thus, every initiative had at least a similar chance of being adopted.
13. In order to minimize missing data, I applied the manifesto calculation procedure – a mix of policy positions and weights (Laver 2001).
14. As an additional test of the proportional hazard assumption, I estimated a Cox model with interaction effects between covariates and process time. The coefficients of the interaction variables were non-zero and highly significant, indicating a clear violation of the proportionality assumption.
15. One could also provide more elaborate specification checks, including similar plots for the inverse-Gaussian, log-normal and sickle models, as well as plots for models with monotonically changing rates, such as the Weibull model.
16. One could also specify time-dependent covariates to estimate the effects of changes in voting rule and parliamentary participation on duration when a decision is pending in the Council. I do not include an error term (ε_{jk} in (5)) because I do not have any substantive reason to assume unobserved heterogeneity. I estimated a gamma heterogeneity model and obtained essentially the same results as I report below.

References

Buchanan, J. & Tullock, G. (1965). *The calculus of consent*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Checkel, J. (2001). Constructing European institutions. In G. Schneider & M. Aspinwall (eds), *The rules of integration: Institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Checkel, J. (2003). Going native in Europe: Theorizing social interaction in European institutions. *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 209–231.

Crombez, C. (1996). Legislative procedures in the European Community. *British Journal of Political Science* 26: 199–228.

Crombez, C. (1997). The co-decision procedure in the European Union. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 97–119.

Crombez, C. (2000). Codecision: Towards a bicameral European Union. *European Union Politics* 3: 363–368.

Crombez, C. (2003). The democratic deficit in the European Union: An impossible quest? *European Union Politics* 4: 101–120.

Egebert, M. (2000). The organisational dimension of integration in the EU (and elsewhere). *ARENA Working Paper Series* 10/2000. Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

European Union Politics (2000). Forum section understanding the EU legislative process. *European Union Politics* 1: 363–382.

Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. (eds) (1985). *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Felsenthal, D. & Machover, M. (2001). Myths and meanings of voting power. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13: 81–97.
Gabel, M. & Hix, S. (2002). Defining the EU policy space: An empirical study of the European elections manifestos, 1979–1999. *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 934–964.
Garrett, G. (1992). International cooperation and institutional choice: The European Community internal market. *International Organization* 46: 533–560.
Garrett, G. & Tsebelis, G. (1999). Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the EU. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11: 291–308.
Garrett, G. & Tsebelis, G. (2001). Even more reasons to resist the temptation to apply power indices to the EU. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13: 99–105.
Golub, J. (1999). In the shadow of the vote? Decision making in the European Community. *International Organization* 53: 733–764.
Green, D. & Shapiro, I. (1994). *Pathologies of rational choice theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Hartley, T. (1994). *The foundations of European Community law* (3rd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hinich, M. & Munger, M. (1997). *Analytical politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hix, S. (1999). Dimensions and alignments in European Union politics: Cognitive constraints and partisan responses. *European Journal of Political Research* 35: 69–106.
Hix, S. (2005). *The political system of the European Union*, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. (2002). Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 965–989.
Hosli, M. (1999). Power, connected coalitions and the Council of the European Union. *International Political Science Review* 20: 371–391.
Journal of Theoretical Politics (1999). Symposium: Power indices and the European Union. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11: 291–366.
Jupille, J., Caporaso, J. & Checkel, J. (2003). Integrating institutions: Rationalism, constructivism and the study of the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 7–40.
Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996). *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Klingemann, H., Hofferbert, R. & Budge, I. (1994). *Parties, policies and democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
König, T. (1996). The constitutional development of European integration. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 8: 553–559.
König, T. (2005). Member State Preferences, Commissioners' Country-bias and the Process of European Legislation. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Organization, Washington, DC, 31 August–3 September.
König, T. & Bräuninger, T. (1998). The inclusiveness of European decision rules. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 10: 125–141.
König, T. & Bräuninger, T. (2004). Accession and reform of the European Union: A game theoretical analysis of Eastern enlargement and constitutional reform. *European Union Politics* 3: 93–124.
König, T. & Pöter, M. (2001). Examining European politics. *European Union Politics* 2: 329–351.
König, T. & Proksch, S. (forthcoming). Exchanging and voting: Endogenizing the spatial model of legislative choice. *Journal of European Public Policy*.

König, T. & Schulz, H. (1997). The Efficiency of Legislative Decision Making in the European Union. Center for German and European Studies Working Paper 1.54, University of California.

Krislov, S., Ehlermann, C. & Weiler, J. (1986). The political organs and the decision-making process in the United States and the European Community. In M. Capelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler (eds), *Integration through law: Europe and the American federal experience*. New York: De Gruyter.

Laver, M. (2001). *Estimating the policy position of political actors*. London: Routledge.

Laver, M. & Budge, I. (1992). *Party policy and government coalitions*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Lewis, J. (2003). Institutional environments and everyday EU decision making. *Comparative Political Studies* 36: 97–124.

Majone, G. (1994). *The European Community as a regulatory state*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof.

Majone, G. (1996). *Regulating Europe*. London: Routledge.

Martin, L.W. & Vanberg, G. (2004). Policing the bargain: Coalition government and parliamentary scrutiny. *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 13–27.

Mattila, M. & Lane, J. (2001). Voting in the EU Council of Ministers: Will enlargement change the unanimity pattern? *European Union Politics* 2: 31–52.

Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is something rotten in the state of Denmark? Constructivism and European integration. *Journal of European Public Policy* 6: 669–681.

Moser, P. (1996). The European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter: What are the conditions? A critique of Tsebelis (1994). *American Political Science Review* 90: 834–838.

Moser, P. (2000). *Decision rules in the European Union: A rational choice perspective*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Nugent, N. (1999). *The government and politics of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Pennings, P. (2002). The dimensionality of the EU policy space. *European Union Politics* 3: 59–80.

Risse, T. (2000). Let's argue! Communicative action in world politics. *International Organization* 54: 1–39.

Risse, T. (2002). Constructivism and international institutions: Toward conversations across paradigms. In I. Katznelson & H.V. Milner (eds), *Political science: The state of the discipline*. London: W. W. Norton & Co.

Romer, T. & Rosenthal, H. (1979). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas and the status quo. *Public Choice* 33: 27–44.

Rosenthal, H. (1990). The setter model. In J. Enelow & M. Hinich (eds), *Advances in the spatial theory of voting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G. (1962). *Democratic theory*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Scharpf, F.W. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schneider, G. (1995). The limits of self-reform: Institution building in the European Community. *European Journal of International Relations* 1: 59–86.

Schneider, G. & Aspinwall, M. (2001). *The rules of integration: Institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Schulz, H. & König, T. (2000). Institutional reform and decision-making efficiency in the European Union. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 653–666.
Scully, R. (1997a). The European Parliament and the co-decision procedure: A reassessment. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3: 58–73.
Scully, R. (1997b). The European Parliament and co-decision: A rejoinder to Tsebelis and Garrett. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3: 93–103.
Selck, T. (2004). On the dimensionality of European Union legislative decision-making. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16: 203–222.
Shepsle, K. & Bonchek, M. (1997). *Analyzing politics: Rationality, behavior and institutions*. New York: Norton.
Sloot, T. & Verschuren, P. (1990). Decision-making speed in the European Community. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 29: 75–85.
Steunenberg, B. (1994). Decision-making under different institutional arrangements: Legislation by the European Community. *Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics* 150: 642–669.
Steunenberg, B. (2000). Constitutional change in the European Union: Parliament's impact on the reform of the codecision procedure. In T.H. Wagenaar (ed.), *Government institutions: Effects, changes and normative foundations*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Steunenberg, B., Schmidtchen, D. & Koboldt, C. (1999). Strategic power in the European Union: Evaluating the distribution of power in policy games. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11: 339–366.
Thomson, R. et al. (eds) (2006). *The European Union decides: The empirical relevance of policy-making models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (1994). The power of the European Parliament as conditional agenda setter. *American Political Science Review* 88: 128–142.
Tsebelis, G. (1997). Maastricht and the democratic deficit. *Aussenwirtschaft* 52: 29–56.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto players: How political institutions work*. New York: Sage.
Tsebelis, G. & Garrett, G. (1997). Agenda setting, vetoes and the European Union's co-decision procedure. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3: 74–92.
Tsebelis, G. et al. (2001). Legislative procedures in the European Union. *British Journal of Political Science* 31: 573–599.
Westlake, M. (1995). *The Council of the European Union*. London: Cartermill International.
Westlake, M. (1998). *The European Union beyond Amsterdam: New concepts of European integration*. London: Routledge.
Widgren, M. (1994). Voting power in EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements. *European Economic Review* 38: 1153–1170.
Zetterholm, S. (ed.) (1994). *National cultures and European integration: Exploratory essays on cultural diversity and common policies*. Oxford: Berg.

Address for correspondence: Thomas König, Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany. Website: http://www.dhv-speyer.de/tkoenig/; E-mail: tkoenig@dhv-speyer.de